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Introduction
A ghost wanders about Europe, a ghost of rising
unemployment. In some countries, such as Ireland
and Spain, the rise in unemployment has been spec-
tacular. In other countries the rise in unemployment
has been milder and its rate is still low. A striking
example of this is the Netherlands, where the unem-
ployment rate amounted only to 4 percent in 2009.
Figure 1 gives an overview of unemployment and
employment developments in the past two decades,
comparing the Netherlands to the EU15.The upper
diagram shows the evolution of unemployment rates
of prime age men (age 25–54) over the period
1988–2008, 2008 being the year before the crisis
started. Clearly, whereas the unemployment rate of
the EU15 at the end of the investigated period was
roughly as high as in its beginning, reaching around
6 percent,the Dutch unemployment rate declined to
about 2 percent in 2008, from 6 percent in 1988.
Furthermore, it is also clear that the cyclical fluctua-
tions in the unemployment rate in this country have
been very much the same as in the EU15. Un-
employment rates declined until the early 1990s,
then increased in 1994/95, fell thereafter until the
early 2000s, rose in 2004/05 and then fell again until
2008, shortly before the crisis started to affect the
unemployment rate. The lower diagram in Figure 1
suggests that in terms of employment rates of prime-
age men,developments in the Netherlands were also
different from those in the EU15. Whereas the
employment rate in the EU15 remained at about
88 percent,its rate increased in the Netherlands from
88 percent in 1988 to 92 percent in 2008.
The drop in unemployment and the increase in
employment during past decades fall under the
heading of ‘Dutch miracle – part I’.The long-lasting
good performance of the Dutch labor market is
attributed to three policy shifts (Visser and
Hemerijck 1997). First, there was wage moderation,
which started in the early 1980s and ended in the
negotiations between trade unions and employers in
1982. Because of this the competitiveness of Dutch
industry increased significantly. Second, there was
the reform of the social security system, starting
with a freezing of benefits in 1983 and an overhaul
of unemployment insurance in 1987, followed by
further reforms in social security in the early 1990s
and the early 2000s. The third policy shift concerns
the innovative labor market policies and the empha-
sis on activating measures of various kinds. Nickell
and Van Ours (2000) conclude that the unemploy-
ment rate in the Netherlands decreased because of
a significant reduction of the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate since the early 1980s. An important
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Dutch labor market from other
European countries is the
emphasis on financial incentives
to get the unemployed back to
work or prevent them from
entering the pool of workers
collecting disability benefits
(see, for example, Van Ours
2006a and 2006b).
The question addressed in this
article is whether there are
lessons to be learned from the
current low level of unemploy-
ment in the Netherlands, which
might go under the heading of
‘Dutch miracle – part II’. A
review of recent developments
in the Dutch labor market is
provided with a focus on finan-
cial incentives and the use of
labor market related benefits, i.e. unemployment
benefits (UB), welfare benefits (WB) and disability
benefits (DB).This will be followed by a comparison
of recent developments in the Netherlands to those
in other European countries and the United States.
After comparing recent policy measures aimed at
tackling the ‘jobs crisis’, some conclusions will final-
ly be drawn.
Recent events in the Netherlands
Pre-crisis characteristics
Table 1 provides an overview of Dutch labor mar-
ket characteristics shortly before the effects of the
crisis started kicking in. The table distinguishes
unemployment rates,employment rates and the use
of benefits by gender and age.1 Unemployment
rates of prime age individuals were rather low in
2008. Even youth unemployment rates, at 5.7 per-
cent for men and 5.5 percent for women, were not
very high. In comparison, unemployment rates
among elderly workers were rather high but still
lower than youth unemployment rates. In 2008
employment rates were low at the extremes of the
age distribution.Yet, for prime age men (consisting
of the age groups between 24 and 54) employment
rates were close to or above 90 percent, compared
to 75 to 85 percent in 2008.
In Table 1 the use of benefits is given as a percentage
share of the population in a particular age group.The
use of unemployment benefits (UB) generally
amounted to below 2 percent in 2008, except for
elderly men (3.5 percent) and elderly women
(2.2 percent). The use of welfare benefits (WB)
increased with age, from less than 1 percent for
young individuals to about 2 to 3 percent for elderly
individuals. The main distinctions between the age
groups are shown in the use of disability benefits
(DB). Whereas 0.5 percent of young men and
2.3 percent of young women collected disability ben-
efits in 2008, the comparable share amounted to
20.8 percent and 14.4 percent for older men and for
older women, respectively.
Unemployment benefits
The law on unemployment insurance benefits was
introduced in 1949 to insure workers against the
financial consequences of unemployment.2 In the
aftermath of the large-scale unemployment growth
in the early 1980s,the UB system was greatly restruc-
tured in 1987. One of the main elements of this
restructuring was to make entitlement to UB depen-
dent on previous work experience.Entitled to unem-
ployment insurance (UI) benefits are all employees
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Table 1
Characteristics of the Dutch labor market, 2008






























































































Notes: U = unemployment rate; unemployment as a percentage of the labor
force, E = employment rate; employment as a percentage of the population
(Pop); UB, WB, DB = unemployment benefits, welfare benefits and dis-
ability benefits as a percentage of the population, respectively. 
Sources: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Netherlands Institute for Social
Insurance (UWV), OECD labor force statistics. 
1 Note that the use of particular benefits is not exclusive of other
benefits. Individuals may, for example, receive part-time disability
benefits in combination with part-time unemployment benefits.
2 Excluded from UB are individuals who receive full-time disabili-
ty benefits or have reached the age of 65.CESifo Forum 1/2010 31
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who become unemployed invol-
untarily and loose their earnings
for at least 5 hours or half of
their working hours. They must
have been employed for a par-
ticular part of the period before
becoming unemployed.The ben-
efits end when individuals are
no longer unemployed or reach
the maximum benefit duration.
The potential benefit duration
(PBD) and the benefit level de-
pend on the type of UI-benefits
that may be collected. After the
1987 reform, individuals were
eligible for short-term benefits,
wage-dependent benefits or ex-
tended benefits. Eligibility for these three benefit
types depended on labor experience and the age at
which the individual became unemployed.The wage-
dependent benefits are granted for at least 6 months
and are extended at 3 months intervals to 4.5 years,
depending on labor experience. Initially, labor expe-
rience was calculated as the number of years in the
5 calendar years prior to being unemployed,in which
the individual has received wages for at least 52 days,
plus the number of calendar years between the year
in which the individual turned 18 and the 5 years
prior to unemployment. In 2005, a larger part of
actual labor market experience was used to deter-
mine potential benefit durations.All individuals who
received wage-related UI-benefits were also entitled
to extended benefits. However, extended benefits
were abolished on 11 August 2003.
In the course of 2006, the new Unemployment
Insurance Act was introduced (see De Mooij 2006).
First, the maximum duration of unemployment ben-
efits was reduced from 60 to 38 months; the maxi-
mum benefit duration in months equals the employ-
ment record in years prior to the application. So, the
maximum period applies to people with an employ-
ment record of 38 years. Second, the benefit level
was raised from 70 to 75 percent of the last wage for
the first two months of unemployment.After this ini-
tial period, benefits were reduced to 70 percent.
Third, the new act had more stringent entitlement
conditions.
Figure 2 illustrates the annual number of unem-
ployment benefits over the period 1988–2009.
There are clear and sizeable fluctuations.Whereas
in 1988 less than 200,000 workers collected unem-
ployment benefits, in 1994/95 this number was
more than 400,000.This was followed by a decline
to a low of 200,000 in 2001,and then an increase to
a little over 300,000 in 2004 and another decline to
200,000 in 2008. So, whereas there are sizeable
fluctuations, there is no clear trend in the use of
unemployment benefits. The upper diagram in
Figure 3 shows the inflow and outflow of unem-
ployment benefits. Clearly, the cyclical fluctua-
tions in benefits flows mimic the fluctuations in
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Figure 3tions in inflow preceding those in the outflow by
about a year.
Unemployed workers are entitled to UB as long as
they fulfill certain requirement with respect to
search intensity and administrative obligations. In
August 1996 a new law on benefit sanctions was
introduced in the Netherlands. Figure 4 presents
information about the use of UI benefit sanctions
over the past 20 years. As a percentage of the stock
of UI benefits, the sanction rate increased substan-
tially from 1988 onwards, from about 17 to 45 per-
cent in 1998. From 2002 onwards there is a strong
decline in the sanction rate,which is due to the num-
ber of sanctions falling more than the number of 
UI benefits.3
Welfare benefits
Welfare benefits (WB) support those people with-
out income who are not entitled to any other ben-
efits scheme. In addition, the individual must be
legally allowed to stay in the Netherlands, and be
over 18 years of age. Unemployment assistance
(UA) benefits are means-tested.If the unemployed
worker has a partner with a sufficiently high labor
income, or if the worker has a sufficiently high
amount of assets, he generally does not qualify for
welfare payments.Young individuals aged 18 to 21
are supposed to be financially supported by their
parents. Welfare recipients have the obligation to
search for a job in order to remain entitled to the
benefits. Municipalities have
the power to provide bonuses
on top of the basic benefits
level. For example, some muni-
cipalities pay bonuses for the
use of sports facilities and pub-
lic transport, or for health-re-
lated expenses. The types of
bonuses, the rules on entitle-
ment to a bonus and the levels
of the bonuses vary consider-
ably across municipalities.
Figure 2 shows the development
of the number of WB over the
past decades. There appears to
be a secular decline apart from
some ‘wrinkles’ that are highly correlated with the
evolution of the unemployment rate. The decline is
from about 600,000 in 1988 to less than 300,000 in
2009.
For a long time, the municipalities could reclaim a
large part of their expenditures on welfare benefits
from the central government. The new Welfare Act
introduced in 2004 changed this. It made local
authorities financially responsible for the welfare
benefits they provide. In particular, local govern-
ments receive a fixed budget for welfare benefits and
activation.If they are successful in getting UA recip-
ients back to work,saved funds can be used for other
local spending.This encourages local governments to
invest in efficient administration, tight monitoring
and tough activation programs.4
Disability benefits
Disability insurance for employees was introduced
in 1967. Under the terms of this law, workers were
insured against wage losses caused by long-term dis-
ability. From then on, if a worker became ill, he was
allowed to claim a benefit under the illness scheme
for a maximum period of one year. After that he
could claim a disability benefit. Workers were enti-
tled to disability benefits (DB) after a so-called dis-
ability examination that consisted not only of a med-
ical examination but also of an investigation of the
labor market position of the worker. A worker was
considered ‘disabled’,if there was no suitable job for
him at his own educational level in his previous























Source: Nehtherlands Institute for Social Insurance (UWV).
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Figure 4
3 The use of benefit sanctions is effective in inducing unemployed
workers to find a job more quickly. Abbring et al. (2005) analyze
how benefit sanctions affect the transition out of unemployment,
using data from the early 1990s. They find that individual re-
employment rates of males increase by about 60 percent and of
females by about 100 percent.
4 Monitoring and benefit sanctions are also very effective in bring-
ing welfare recipients back to work more quickly – see, for exam-
ple,Van der Klaauw et al. (2004).CESifo Forum 1/2010 33
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occupation. Furthermore, unemployment was ‘inter-
nalized’, which means that those workers who were
considered to be partially (more than 15 percent)
disabled,could collect full disability benefits because
it was assumed that the partially disabled were
doomed to remain unemployed. The benefit
amounted to a maximum of 80 percent of the wage
in the last job. The DB could be collected until
age 65.
Since its introduction, the number of workers col-
lecting disability insurance (DI) benefits has
increased massively. This huge increase in DB num-
bers induced the government to adjust the system
several times. In 1985, the maximum replacement
rate was reduced from 80 to 70 percent.In 1987 there
was a major restructuring of the DI benefit system,
whose the main objective was to reduce the inflow
into disability. The most important change was the
abolition of the ‘internalization of unemployment
rules’. Partially disabled workers were considered as
such and were expected to find a job or claim unem-
ployment benefits for their remaining work capaci-
ty.5 In the early 1990s, there were some further
changes.The DI premium was experience-rated, the
disability examination no longer considered the
availability of suitable jobs with respect to education
and previous employment, the duration of benefits
was limited to five years, after which a re-examina-
tion had to take place, and all disabled workers
below 50 years of age had to be re-examined. In
2002,the so-called ‘gatekeeper’ model was extended.
In this model employers and workers carry more
responsibility concerning the inflow of workers into
disability.
In 2006, the government replaced the disability
scheme by the Law on Work and Income According
to Labor Capacity – WIA (see De Mooij 2006).As
before, WIA offers insurance for occupational dis-
eases and employment injuries (risque profession-
nel) and for other risks (risque social). People can
apply for WIA after a period of two years of sick
leave that are covered by employers. WIA consists
of two schemes:one for the fully and long-term dis-
abled (IVA), and the other for the partially dis-
abled (WGA). The term ‘fully and long-term dis-
abled’ means that someone will never be able to
earn more than 20 percent of his previous salary.
The IVA equals 75 percent of the final wage until
retirement.
Figure 2 also presents the development of the DB
number in the past two decades. It increased until
1990.Then after a decline in the number of benefits,
the use of DB increased again and reached a maxi-
mum in the early 2000s, followed by a reduction
thereafter.The lower diagram of Figure 3 depicts the
inflow and outflow of DB. Until the early 1990s, the
entry into DB was substantially larger than the exit.
In the 1990s there were a number of reforms which
are discussed in more detail below and over a couple
of years in the mid-1990s the outflow was larger than
the inflow, causing a decline of the DB stock. The
reform of the DI system in the early 2000s also con-
tributed to the outflow being larger than the inflow
for a couple of years. After the most recent reform,




Figure 5 shows recent changes in unemployment
rates across a number of European countries and the
United States. The upper diagram plots the unem-
ployment rates in the fourth quarters of 2006 and
2009. Clearly, except for Germany, these rates
increased over this three year period. Unemploy-
ment growth was particularly significant in Spain,
Ireland and the United States.The lower diagram of
Figure 5 gives the most recent growth, from the
fourth quarter of 2008 to that of 2009. In this later
period, unemployment rates went up in all countries
by the same figure. Surprisingly, with the exception
of Ireland and Spain,it is a shift that occurred almost
parallel to the straight line shown in the diagram,
which indicates a non-changing unemployment rate.
Apparently the crisis has affected countries in a sim-
ilar way.
The upper diagram of Figure 6 shows the relation-
ship of GDP growth in 2008 to the change of the
unemployment rate in 2009. Although there is
variation across countries (and Spain is an ex-
ception), there is a clear negative relationship
between GDP growth and change in the unem-
ployment rate.To the extent that there is variation
in unemployment growth, this can be at least to
5 Empirical studies find that before the DB system reform in 1987
up to 50 percent of the disability enrollment was related to the
redundancy of workers. Hassink et al. (1997), for example, show
that at the end of the 1980s employers used disability enrollment
as an alternative to dismissals. They find that about 10 percent of
the transitions into disability were due to the redundancy of the
worker.some extent explained by differences in GDP
growth.
Tackling the jobs crisis
Many countries have used extensive fiscal packages
to support their economy and thus aggregate
demand. So, at least in the short run, job losses were
limited.In addition,many countries have taken addi-
tional measures to cushion the effects of the crisis on
their labor market.
Table 2 provides an overview of these additional
measures.6 The measures are categorized under four
headings. First, there are measures to support labor
demand, including reductions in non-wage labor
costs and new or expanded job subsidies as well as
public sector job-creation schemes. New subsidies to
encourage short-time working schemes, which avoid
layoffs, have been introduced in some countries
while existing schemes have been reinforced in other
countries. Eligibility for short-time subsidies has
been extended to new groups of workers and partic-
ipation has been made more attractive by increasing
the maximum duration of the subsidies. The intro-
duction of subsidized training for workers on short-
time work is a notable new tendency.7 Second, there
are measures aimed at helping the unemployed find
work. Some countries relaxed activation require-
ments, while others have tightened activation
requirements for the unemployed by intensifying
contacts with the case-workers. Most countries
strengthened job search assistance available to the
unemployed, sometimes targeted at particular
groups or regions facing high numbers of mass
redundancies. A number of countries expanded the
capacity of their public employment service. Some
countries introduced expanded work experience
programs; other countries expanded training pro-
grams with often the extra training slots being
reserved for vulnerable groups. A third category
comprises income support measures for job losers
and low paid workers. Some countries reinforced
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6 The information in this table comes from an OECD/EC ques-
tionnaire sent to all member countries in January 2009 with an
update of responses in May 2009.The information refers to discre-
tionary measures at a national level.
7 The short-time work scheme in the Netherlands has a novel fea-
ture which requires employers to reimburse one-half of the benefit
paid to participating employees if they are dismissed during the
three months following short-time work.CESifo Forum 1/2010 35
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income support for job losers through changes of
unemployment benefits, social assistance or in-kind
support systems. Other countries increased benefit
generosity, extended maximum benefit durations or
combined the two. The fourth heading relates to
other training measures.Most of the measures are of
a temporary nature, and additional funds for labor
market programs are rather limited. Indeed, the
lower diagram of Figure 6 shows that there is no
obvious relationship of the number of crisis policy
measures to the change in unemployment rates in
2009.
Conclusion
The Netherlands has been successful in bringing
unemployment rates down to a level far below the
European average. This improvement of the labor
market falls under the heading of ‘Dutch miracle –
part I’.There was no blueprint for the reform of the
labor market. Not everything was carefully planned,
and the effects of the reforms did not occur immedi-
ately. The Netherlands started the reform of the
social security system in the mid-1980s and contin-
ued it until the second half of the 1990s before the
Dutch employment miracle occurred.
Although the economic crisis kicked in, the unem-
ployment rate in the Netherlands has remained low
and it looks like the Dutch miracle is continuing.
The ‘Dutch miracle – part II’ is not due to recent
crisis policy measures, but to a structural improve-
ment of the Dutch labor market.The latter does not
mean, however, that the labor market is robust to
cyclical fluctuations in the economy. Indeed, as
Figure 2 shows, the cyclical fluctuations in the
Netherlands and across Europe are very much the
same. This graph provides the best representation
of the idea that bringing unemployment down
requires restructuring of the labor market and a lot
of time. It does not seem to be possible to deviate
from these long-term developments over a short-
time period. Country-specific labor market policies
to tackle the crisis are bound to have limited short-
run effects.
Table 2
Discretionary changes in labor market policy in response to the economic downturn
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x x x 
Notes: This table refers only to federal government initiatives; in Denmark active labor market expenditure increases
automatically when the unemployment rate increases; neither these automatic increases, nor increases in expenditure on
unemployment benefits as a result of growing numbers of unemployed, are shown in the table.
Source: OECD (2009c).References
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